That David Cameron has promised his citizens a referendum to decide
whether the United Kingdom remains within the EU or not is just the
latest development in the ever-complex relationship between London and
continental Europe. But that's not all. This future referendum, and
the causes that have led to it, highlight some of the enormous
challenges the EU faces today, challenges that are threatening the
future traditionally envisioned by the pro-European movement.
The tremendous intensity and duration of the economic crisis is
causing cracks to form within Europe. Divisions that before had been
simmering in the background, blurred but real, have become more and
more noticable. One of the big questions that has emerged due to the
crisis has to do with European identity. The economic crisis has been
and continues to be a source of additional pressure, making it harder
and harder for European citizens to feel they all share a common
European idea and sentiment.
Among the cracks we were referring to above there is one, or in fact
two, that are proving to be particularly worrisome. They are two sides
of the same coin. I am referring to the division between European
creditor states and debtor states, an economic division, and between
northern and southern states in Europe, which is a division of a
cultural nature and, in certain cases, is closely linked to feelings
of contempt and even xenophobia. This second side of the coin is a
symbolic construct, or to be more precise, it is the updated version
of a particular concept of the people from southern Europe this is
made up of old prejudices mixed with a few real events. In fact, this
concept is to a large extent how the creditors justify their attitude
and their positionings regarding their neighbors to the south. Germany
leads the group of creditor countries and also plays the role of the
great European economic powerhouse. It is this position of power that
has turned it into the boss of Europe. If we look at the policies that
Germany has been promoting within the Eurozone and the EU, we have to
conclude that until now it has acted more like a strict creditor than
a true constructive leader of Europe. Policies regarding debtor
countries have been guided more by old traumas –the hyperinflation
during the Weimar Republic— and particular interests —getting back
their borrowed money— than a truly ambitious and meaningful idea of
Europe.
The functionalism that inspired the founding fathers, based on the
belief that increasing economic interconnection would lead to greater
political cohesion, has proved to be only partially successful. Many
years on the Danes are just as Danish —or even more so than before—,
the Portuguese, Portuguese and the Germans, German. European identity
is quite thin, much thinner than national identities. The feeling of
belonging to a community of Europeans has grown very modestly, if at
all. One example of this is the aforementioned policy relating to the
debtor countries and proclamations such as "they had it coming to
them." Most people and groups are usually more inclined to feel
understanding and solidarity with those they feel closest to, more
like family, and more similar to. With the people they share the most
with. In other words, as a general rule we tend to be more willing to
help our siblings than our cousins, and to help the cousins of our
siblings before our cousins' cousins. I would say that for many
Germans today the citizens of southern Europe have ended up becoming
equivalent of relatives from afar, irresponsible, wasteful and
exploitive.
It is clear that it is not just the crisis that has called European
identity into question. Globalization also tends to favor a different
–broader and more diffuse— dimension. In addition, states do
everything they can (and then some) to ensure that collective
identities continue to revolve around these states, without
evaporating upwards, or without melting away in favor of what they
call national minorities. (In other words, identities that don't have
a state to back them, a situation that the Catalan case illustrates
quite well). Europe will find itself deeply transformed, and this is
already happening today, due to the current economic turmoil. The
Europe of tomorrow could become a more political Europe, something
that will happen inevitably if we democratically legitimize certain
structures that today are perceived to be remote, bureaucratic and
practically incomprehensible. This democratization should strengthen
the European sentiment and the European identity. But what could also
happen is that the transformation might limit itself to the forced
improvement of institutions and economic governing mechanisms, while
politics itself becomes irrelevant, paralyzed, desiccated. This would
be a Europe empty on the inside, soulless. A Europe without Europeans.
http://intocabledigital.cat/a-europe-without-europeans/44545/
